SCOPUS 정보 검색 플랫폼

Volumn 148, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 2749-2762

Surplus extraction with rich type spaces

Author keywords

Correlated information; Information rents; Mechanism design; Partial implementation; Private information; Surplus extraction

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888036133 PISSN: 00220531 EISSN: 10957235 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2013.07.016 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (7)

References (11)

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