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Economic Theory

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 477-489

A note on budget balance under interim participation constraints: The case of independent types

(2) Börgers, Tilman a Norman, Peter b

a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN (United States)

b UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA (United States)

Author keywords

Budget balance; Mechanism design; Participation constraints

Indexed keywords

EID: 62949101195 PISSN: 09382259 EISSN: 14320479 Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0347-7 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (31)

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