The Evolution of Social Norms

Annual Review of Economics

Volumn 7, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 359-387

  Young, H Peyton ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Equilibrium selection; Evolutionary game theory; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84938583959     PISSN: 19411383     EISSN: 19411391     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115322     Document Type: Article

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