Conventional Contracts

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 65, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 773-792

  Young, H Peyton ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000922586     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-937X.00068     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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