Rapid innovation diffusion in social networks

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 111, Issue SUPPL.3, 2014, Pages 10881-10888

  Kreindler, Gabriel E ^a   Young, H Peyton ^b,c  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^c UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Convergence time; Coordination game; Local interaction model; Logit; Noisy best response

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COORDINATION; GAME; INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION; MASS COMMUNICATION; NOISE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL INTERACTION; SOCIAL NETWORK; STATISTICS;

CONVERGENCE TIME; COORDINATION GAME; LOCAL INTERACTION MODEL; LOGIT; NOISY BEST RESPONSE;

COMMUNITY NETWORKS; COMPUTER SIMULATION; DIFFUSION OF INNOVATION; HUMANS; INFORMATION DISSEMINATION; MODELS, THEORETICAL; SOCIAL SUPPORT; STOCHASTIC PROCESSES; TIME FACTORS;

EID: 84904696787     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1400842111     Document Type: Article

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