Fast convergence in evolutionary equilibrium selection

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 80, Issue , 2013, Pages 39-67

  Kreindler, Gabriel E ^a   Young, H Peyton ^b  

^a NUFFIELD COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Convergence time; Logit learning; Markov chain; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 84876059366     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.02.004     Document Type: Article

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