Clever Agents in Young's Evolutionary Bargaining Model

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 86, Issue 2, 1999, Pages 268-279

  Saez Martí, Maria ^a   Weibull, Jörgen W ^a,b  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^b RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS IFN   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Bargaining; Evolution; Game theory

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001679430     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2528     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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3. K. Binmore, Perfect equilibrium in bargaining models, in "The Economics of Bargaining" (K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta, Eds.), pp. 77-107, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987.
4. T. Ellingsen, The evolution of bargaining behaviour, Quart. J. Econ. 449 (1997), 581-602.
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8. n players, Games Econ. Behav. 5 (1993), 604-617.
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