Learning from Personal Experience: One Rational Guy and the Justification of Myopia

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 180-210

  Ellison, Glenn ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0001723314     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0555     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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