State or nature? Endogenous formal versus informal sanctions in the voluntary provision of public goods

Experimental Economics

Volumn 18, Issue 1, 2015, Pages 38-65

  Kamei, Kenju ^a   Putterman, Louis ^b   Tyran, Jean Robert ^c,d  

^a BOWLING GREEN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^d UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN   (Denmark)

Author keywords

Experiment; Public goods; Punishment; Sanction; Social dilemma; Voluntary contribution mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937158756     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: 15736938     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-014-9405-0     Document Type: Article

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