The evolution of sanctioning institutions: An experimental approach to the social contract

Experimental Economics

Volumn 17, Issue 2, 2014, Pages 285-303

  Zhang, Boyu ^a,b   Li, Cong ^c   De Silva, Hannelore ^b   Bednarik, Peter ^d   Sigmund, Karl ^b,e  

^a BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c INSTITUTE OF ZOOLOGY   (China)

^d UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

^e INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Collective action; Experiments; Institution; Public goods; Punishment; Social learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 84900305308     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7     Document Type: Article

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