Setting the right mix-Analyzing outside directors' pay mix in public family firms

Journal of Family Business Strategy

Volumn 6, Issue 2, 2015, Pages 130-140

  Engel, Pascal J ^a   Hack, Andreas ^b,c   Kellermanns, Franz W ^a,d  

^a WHU OTTO BEISHEIM SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERN   (Switzerland)

^c UNIVERSITY OF WITTEN HERDECKE   (Germany)

^d UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHARLOTTE   (United States)

Author keywords

Corporate governance; Family firms; Pay mix; Socioemotional wealth

Indexed keywords

EID: 84932193303     PISSN: 18778585     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfbs.2015.04.002     Document Type: Article

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