The determinants of employee compensation in family firms: Empirical evidence

Family Business Review

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 215-228

  Carrasco Hernandez, Antonio ^a   Sánchez Marín, Gregorio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MURCIA   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34547786739     PISSN: 08944865     EISSN: 17416248     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1741-6248.2007.00096.x     Document Type: Article

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