Founder Versus Family Owners’ Impact on Pay Dispersion Among Non-CEO Top Managers: Implications for Firm Performance

Journal of Management

Volumn 43, Issue 5, 2017, Pages 1524-1552

  Jaskiewicz, Peter ^a   Block, Joern H ^b,c   Miller, Danny ^d,e   Combs, James G ^f  

^a Dept of Electrical and Computer Engineering   (Canada)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TRIER   (Germany)

^c ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

^d HEC MONTRÉAL   (Canada)

^e UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA   (Canada)

^f UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA   (United States)

Author keywords

agency theory; family firms; founder firms; pay dispersion; signaling theory; top management teams

Indexed keywords

EID: 85017013883     PISSN: 01492063     EISSN: 15571211     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0149206314558487     Document Type: Article

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