The impact of family representation on CEO compensation

Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice

Volumn 34, Issue 6, 2010, Pages 1125-1144

  Combs, James G ^a   Penney, Christopher R ^a   Crook, T Russell ^b   Short, Jeremy C ^c  

^a FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TENNESSEE   (United States)

^c TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78449264139     PISSN: 10422587     EISSN: 15406520     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-6520.2010.00417.x     Document Type: Article

References (58)

1. Aggarwal, R.K. & Samwick, A.A. (1999). The other side of the trade-off: The impact of risk on executive compensation. The Journal of Political Economy, 107, 65-105.
2. Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. (2003). Founding-family ownership and firm performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance, 58, 1301-1328.
3. Anderson, R.C. & Reeb, D.M. (2004). Board composition: Balancing family influence in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Science Quarterly, 49, 209-237.
4. Astrachan, J.H. & Jaskiewicz, P. (2008). Emotional returns and emotional costs in privately held family businesses: Advancing traditional business valuation. Family Business Review, 21, 139-149.
5. Baysinger, B.D. & Hoskisson, R.E. (1990). The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management Review, 15, 72-87.
6. Baysinger, B.D., Kosnik, R.D., & Turk, T.A. (1991). Effects of board and ownership structure on corporate R&D strategy. Academy of Management Journal, 34, 205-214.
7. Braun, M. & Sharma, A. (2007). Should the CEO also be chair of the board? An empirical examination of family-controlled public firms. Family Business Review, 20, 111-126.
8. Certo, S.T., Daily, C.M., Canella, A.A., & Dalton, D.R. (2003). Giving money to get money: How CEO stock options and CEO equity enhances IPO valuations. Academy of Management Journal, 46, 643-653.
9. Chrisman, J.J., Chua, J.H., & Litz, R.A. (2004). Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 28, 335-355.
10. Chua, J.H., Chrisman, J.J., & Sharma, P. (1999). Defining the family business by behavior. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23, 19-39.
11. Coles, J.W., McWilliams, V.B., & Sen, N. (2001). An examination of the relationship of governance mechanisms to performance. Journal of Management, 27, 23-50.
12. Combs, J.G. & Skill, M.S. (2003). Managerialist and human capital explanations for key executive pay premiums: A contingency perspective. Academy of Management Journal, 46, 63-73.
13. Conyon, M.J. & Peck, S.I. (1998). Board control, renumeration committees, and top management compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 146-157.
14. Core, J.E., Holthausen, R.W., & Larcker, D.F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51, 371-406.
15. Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., Ellstrand, A.E., & Johnson, J.L. (1998). Meta-analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic Management Journal, 19, 269-290.
16. Davis, J., Schoorman, D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management Review, 22, 20-46.
17. Devers, C.E., Cannella, A.A., Reilly, G.P., & Yoder, M.E. (2007). Executive compensation: A multidisciplinary review of recent developments. Journal of Management, 33, 1016-1072.
18. Dyer, W.G. & Whetten, D.A. (2006). Family firms and social responsibility: Preliminary evidence from the S&P 500. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30, 785-802.
19. Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989). Agency theory: An assessment and review. Academy of Management Review, 14, 57-74.
20. Ezzamel, M. & Watson, R. (1998). Market comparison earnings and the bidding-up of executive cash compensation: Evidence from the United Kingdom. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 221-233.
21. Fama, E.F. (1980). Agency problems and the theory of the firm. The Journal of Political Economy, 88, 288-307.
22. Fama, E.F. & Jensen, M.C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. Journal of Law & Economics, 26, 327-349.
23. Finkelstein, S. & Boyd, B.K. (1998). How much does the CEO matter? The role of managerial discretion in the setting of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 41, 179-199.
24. Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Haynes, K.T., Nunez-Nickel, M., Jacobson, K.J.L., & Moyano-Fuentes, J. (2007). Socioemotional wealth and business risks in family-controlled firms: Evidence from Spanish olive oil mills. Administrative Science Quarterly, 52, 106-137.
25. Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Larraza-Kintana, M., & Makri, M. (2003). The determinants of executive compensation in family-controlled public corporations. Academy of Management Journal, 46, 226-237.
26. Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Nunez-Nickel, M., & Gutierrez, I. (2001). The role of family ties in agency contracts. Academy of Management Journal, 44, 81-95.
27. Gomez-Mejia, L.R., Tosi, H.L., & Hinkin, T. (1987). Managerial control, performance, and executive compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 30, 51-70.
28. Hartzell, J.C. & Starks, L.T. (2003). Institutional investors and executive compensation. The Journal of Finance, 6, 2351-2374.
29. Hayward, M.L.A. & Hambrick, D.C. (1997). Explaining the premiums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 103-127.
30. He, L. (2008). Do founders matter? A study of executive compensation, governance structure and firm performance. Journal of Business Venturing, 23, 257-279.
31. Hellmann, T. & Puri, M. (2002). Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms: Empirical evidence. Journal of Finance, 57, 169-197.
32. Henderson, A.D. & Fredrickson, J.W. (1996). Information-processing demands as a determinant of CEO compensation. Academy of Management Journal, 39, 575-606.
33. Hill, C.W.L. & Phan, P. (1991). CEO tenure as a determinant of CEO pay. Academy of Management Journal, 34, 707-717.
34. Jensen, M. & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360.
35. Jensen, M. & Murphy, K. (1990). Performance pay and top-management incentives. Journal of Political Economy, 98, 225-264.
36. Jensen, M.C. & Zimmerman, J.L. (1985). Management compensation and the managerial labor market. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7, 3-9.
37. Jones, L.V. (1952). Test of hypotheses: One-tailed vs. two-sided alternatives. Psychological Bulletin, 49, 43-46.
38. McGahan, A.M. & Porter, M.E. (1997). How much does industry matter, really. Strategic Management Journal, 18, 15-30.
39. Mehran, H. (1995). Executive compensation structure, ownership, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 38, 163-184.
40. Merton, R.C. (1973). An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. Econometrica, 41, 867-887.
41. Miller, D. (1991). Stale in the saddle: CEO tenure and the match between organization and environment. Management Science, 37, 34-52.
42. Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Lester, R., & Cannella, A. (2007). Family firm performance revisited. Journal of Corporate Finance, 13, 829-858.
43. Ocasio, W. (1994). Political dynamics and the circulation of power: CEO succession in U.S. industrial corporations, 1960-1990. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39, 586-611.
44. O'Connor, J.P., Priem, R.L., Coombs, J.E., & Gilley, K.M. (2006). Do CEO stock options prevent or promote fraudulent financial reporting? Academy of Management Journal, 49, 483-500.
45. Pollock, T.G., Fisher, H.M., & Wade, J.B. (2002). The role of power and politics in the repricing of executive options. Academy of Management Journal, 45, 1172-1182.
46. Rediker, K. & Seth, A. (1995). Boards of directors and substitution effects of alternative governance mechanisms. Strategic Management Journal, 16, 85-99.
47. Sanders, G. (2001). Behavioral responses of CEOs to stock ownership and stock option pay. Academy of Management Journal, 44, 477-492.
48. Sanders, W.G. & Hambrick, D.C. (2008). Swinging for the fences: The effects of CEO stock options on company risk taking and performance. Academy of Management Journal, 50, 1055-1078.
49. Schulze, W.S., Lubatkin, M.H., Dino, R.N., & Buchholtz, A.K. (2001). Agency relationships in family firms: Theory and evidence. Organization Science, 12, 99-116.
50. Semadeni, M., Cannella, A.A., Fraser, D.R., & Lee, D.S. (2008). Fight or flights: Managing stigma in executive careers. Strategic Management Journal, 29, 557-567.
51. Sharma, P., Chrisman, J.J., & Chua, J.H. (1997). Strategic management of the family business: Past research and future challenges. Family Business Review, 10, 1-36.
52. Tosi, H.L., Werner, S., Katz, J.P., & Gomez-Mejia, L.R. (2000). How much does performance matter? A meta-analysis of CEO pay studies. Journal of Management, 26, 301-339.
53. Villalonga, B. & Amit, R. (2006). How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics, 80, 385-417.
54. Wasserman, N. (2006). Stewards, agents, and the founder discount: Executive compensation in new ventures. Academy of Management Journal, 49, 960-976.
55. Westhead, P. & Cowling, M. (1999). Family firm research: The need for a methodological rethink. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 45, 31-56.
56. Wiseman, R.M. & Bromiley, P. (1996). Toward a model of risk in declining organizations: An empirical examination of risk, performance, and decline. Organization Science, 5, 524-543.
57. Yermack, D. (1995). Do corporations award CEO stock options effectively. Journal of Financial Economics, 39, 237-269.
58. Young, M.N., Peng, M.W., Ahlstrom, G.D., Bruton, G.D., & Jiang, Y. (2008). Corporate governance in emerging economies: A review of the principal-principal perspective. Journal of Management Studies, 45(22), 196-220.