Rational herds: Economic models of social learning

Rational Herds Economic Models of Social Learning

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-402

  Chamley, Christophe P ^a  

^a BOSTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929726239     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511616372     Document Type: Book

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