Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections

Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 108, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 34-55

  Dekel, Eddie ^a   Piccione, Michele ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ELECTION; THEORETICAL STUDY; VOTING BEHAVIOR;

EID: 0034040259     PISSN: 00223808     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/262110     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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