Dynamic speculative attacks

American Economic Review

Volumn 93, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 603-621

  Chamley, Christophe ^a,b  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b EHESS DELTA ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 2942709852     PISSN: 00028282     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1257/000282803322157007     Document Type: Article

References (19)

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