Anchoring economic predictions in common knowledge

Econometrica

Volumn 70, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 439-480

  Guesnerie, R ^a  

^a ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

Author keywords

"Eductive" and "evolutive" learning; Common Knowledge; Rational expectations equilibria

Indexed keywords

FORECASTING; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; VECTORS;

RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIA;

ECONOMICS;

EID: 0036217290     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-0262.00292     Document Type: Article

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