Learning from others: A welfare analysis

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 20, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 177-200

  Vives, Xavier ^a  

^a Barcelona)   (Spain)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031206613     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0562     Document Type: Article

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