Social learning and rational expectations

European Economic Review

Volumn 40, Issue 3-5, 1996, Pages 589-601

  Vives, Xavier ^a  

^a Barcelona)   (Spain)

Author keywords

Herding; Information externalities; Informational cascade; Rational expectations; Social learning

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000509916     PISSN: 00142921     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(95)00072-0     Document Type: Article

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