Motives and Implementation: On the Design of Mechanisms to Elicit Opinions

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 79, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 157-173

  Glazer, Jacob ^a   Rubinstein, Ariel ^a,b  

^a TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY   (Israel)

^b PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000247820     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2385     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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2. S. Baliga, The Not-So-Secret-Agent: Implementation and Professional Monitors, Kellogg Graduate School of Management (M.E.D.S.), Northwestern University, 1996.
3. Jackson M. Bayesian implementation. Econometrica. 59:1991;461-478.
4. Moore J. Implementation, contracts, and renegotiation in environments with complete information. Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. 1992;Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge. p. 182-282.
5. Osborne M., Rubinstein A. A Course in Game Theory. 1994;MIT Press, Cambridge.
6. Palfrey T. Implementation in Bayesian equilibrium: The multiple equilibrium problem in mechanism design. Laffont J. J. Advances in Economic Theory: Sixth World Congress. 1992;283-323 Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge.
7. Palfrey T., Srivastava S. Mechanism design with incomplete information: A solution to the implementation problem. J. Polit. Econ. 97:1989;668-691.
8. Radner R., Stiglitz J. A nonconcavity in the value of information. Boyer M., Kihlstrom R. E. Bayesian Models in Economic Theory. 1984;Elsevier, Amsterdam/New York.