Herding and the Winner's Curse in Markets with Sequential Bids

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 85, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 91-121

  Neeman, Zvika ^a   Orosel, Gerhard O ^b  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0007123682     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1998.2495     Document Type: Article

References (20)

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