Ex Post Regret and the Decentralized Sharing of Information

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 27, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 114-131

  Minehart, Deborah ^a   Scotchmer, Suzanne ^b  

^a Boston University   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Rational expectations; regret; herds

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040733839     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1998.0682     Document Type: Article

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