Politically connected boards and top executive pay in Chinese listed firms

Strategic Management Journal

Volumn 36, Issue 6, 2015, Pages 890-906

  Chizema, Amon ^a   Liu, Xiaohui ^a   Lu, Jiangyong ^b   Gao, Lan ^a  

^a LOUGHBOROUGH UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

^b Peking University   (China)

Author keywords

China; corporate governance; politically connected directors; social comparison theory; top executive pay

Indexed keywords

MANAGEMENT; PLANNING;

CHINA; CORPORATE GOVERNANCE; POLITICALLY CONNECTED DIRECTORS; SOCIAL COMPARISON THEORY; TOP EXECUTIVE;

DISPERSIONS;

EID: 84928586027     PISSN: 01432095     EISSN: 10970266     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1002/smj.2253     Document Type: Article

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