Extended cognition and epistemic luck

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 18, 2013, Pages 4201-4214

  Carter, J Adam ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b EINDHOVEN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Epistemic luck; Extended cognition; Knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 84922399576     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-013-0267-3     Document Type: Article

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