Combating anti anti-luck epistemology

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 89, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 47-58

  Madison, B J C ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME   (Australia)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78951488063     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048400903524375     Document Type: Review

References (42)

1. Ayer, A. J. 1956. The Problem of Knowledge, London: Macmillan.
2. Chisholm, Roderick 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
3. Chisholm, Roderick 1989. Theory of Knowledge, 3rd edn, Englewood, N. J.: Prentice-Hall.
4. Comesaña, Juan 2005. Unsafe Knowledge, Synthese 146/3: 395-404.
5. Conee, Earl 1988. Why Solve the Gettier Problem?, in Philosophical Analysis, ed. D. F. Austin, Dordrecht: Kluwer: 55-8.
6. DeRose, Keith and Ted Warfield, eds, 1999. Skepticism: A Contemporary Reader, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
7. Dretske, Fred 1971. Conclusive Reasons, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 49/1: 1-22.
8. Feldman, Richard 1974. An Alleged Defect in Gettier Counter-Examples, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 52/1: 68-9.
9. Gettier, Edmund 1963. Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, Analysis 23/6: 121-3.
10. Goldman, Alvin 1979. What Is Justified Belief?, in Justification and Knowledge, ed. George S. Pappas, Dordrecht: Reidel: 1-23.
11. Goldman, Alvin 1986. Epistemology and Cognition, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
12. Goldman, Alvin 1992. Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge, reprinted in his Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press: 85-103.
13. Greco, John 1999. Agent Reliabilism, Philosophical Perspectives 13: 273-96.
14. Greco, John 2000. Putting Skeptics in Their Place: The Nature of Skeptical Arguments and Their Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
15. Greco, John, ed., 2009. The Oxford Handbook of Scepticism, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
16. Harman, Gilbert 1973. Thought, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
17. Hetherington, Stephen 1998. Actually Knowing, The Philosophical Quarterly 48/193: 453-69.
18. Hetherington, Stephen 2001. Good Knowledge, Bad Knowledge, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
19. Hetherington, Stephen 2005. Gettier Problems, The Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, URL=〈http://www.iep.utm.edu/g/gettier.htm〉
20. Hetherington, Stephen 2007. Is This a WorldWhere Knowledge Has to Include Justification?, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75/1: 41-69.
21. Hetherington, Stephen forthcoming. The Gettier Problem, in Routledge Companion to Epistemology, ed. S. Bernecker and D. Pritchard, London: Routledge.
22. Kaplan, Mark 1985. It's Not What You Know That Counts, The Journal of Philosophy 82/7: 350-63.
23. Luper, Steven 2006. Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account, Synthese 153/1: 161-70.
24. Neta, Ram and Guy Rohrbaugh 2004. Luminosity and the Safety of Knowledge, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 85/4: 396-406.
25. Nozick, Robert 1981. Philosophical Explanations, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
26. Plato, 1997. Meno, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. J. M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing: 870-97.
27. Pritchard, Duncan 2005. Epistemic Luck, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
28. Pritchard, Duncan 2007. Anti-Luck Epistemology, Synthese 158/3: 277-97.
29. Pritchard, Duncan 2009. Knowledge, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
30. Riggs, Wayne 2002. Reliability and the Value of Knowledge, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64/1: 79-96.
31. Russell, Bertrand 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Its Limits, London: Allen and Unwin.
32. Sartwell, Crispin 1991. Knowledge is Merely True Belief, American Philosophical Quarterly 28/2: 157-65.
33. Sartwell, Crispin 1992. Why Knowledge is Merely True Belief, The Journal of Philosophy 89/4: 167-80.
34. Shope, Robert K., ed., 1983. The Analysis of Knowledge: A Decade of Research, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
35. Sosa, Ernest 1999. How to Defeat Opposition to Moore, Philosophical Perspectives 13: 141-54.
36. Swinburne, Richard 1995. Response to Warrant, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55/2: 415-19.
37. Swinburne, Richard 2001. Epistemic Justification, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
38. Unger, Peter 1968. An Analysis of Factual Knowledge, Journal of Philosophy 65/6: 157-70.
39. Weinberg, J. M., S. Nichols and S. Stich 2001. Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions, Philosophical Topics 29/1&2: 429-60.
40. Williamson, Timothy 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
41. Zagzebski, Linda 1994. The Inescapability of Gettier Problems, Philosophical Quarterly 44/174: 65-73.
42. Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus 1996. Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.