The extended knower

Philosophical Explorations

Volumn 15, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 207-218

  Hetherington, Stephen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES   (Australia)

Author keywords

Baron Reed; epistemic attributability; epistemic externalism; epistemic internalism; extended mind; fallibilism; gradualism; knowledge; skepticism

Indexed keywords

EID: 84861744131     PISSN: 13869795     EISSN: 17415918     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13869795.2012.670721     Document Type: Article

References (24)

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16. Hetherington, S. 2005. Fallibilism. The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. http://www.iep.utm.edu/f/fallibil.htm.
17. Hetherington, S. 2010. The Gettier non-problem. Logos & Episteme 1: 85-107.
18. Hetherington, S. 2011. How to know: A practicalist conception of knowledge. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
19. Hetherington, S. forthcoming. The Gettier illusion: Gettier-partialism and infallibilism. Synthese. DOI: 10.1007/s11229-011-9924-6.
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