Anti-Luck Epistemology and Safety's (Recent) Discontents

Philosophia

Volumn 38, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 517-532

  Carter, Joseph Adam ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Epistemic luck; Gettier; Knowledge; Safety

Indexed keywords

EID: 77956324526     PISSN: 00483893     EISSN: 15749274     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11406-009-9219-z     Document Type: Article

References (12)

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