Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability

Synthese

Volumn 190, Issue 17, 2013, Pages 3715-3729

  Carter, J Adam ^a   Jarvis, Benjamin ^b   Rubin, Katherine ^c  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH   (United Kingdom)

^b QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY BELFAST   (United Kingdom)

^c BROWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Cognitive ability; Epistemic value; Knowledge

Indexed keywords

EID: 84888132774     PISSN: 00397857     EISSN: 15730964     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-012-0220-x     Document Type: Article

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