Knowledge: The safe-apt view

Australasian Journal of Philosophy

Volumn 91, Issue 2, 2013, Pages 265-278

  Kelp, Christoph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEUVEN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Knowledge; safety; virtue epistemology

Indexed keywords

EID: 84877745751     PISSN: 00048402     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/00048402.2012.673726     Document Type: Article

References (16)

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3. Greco, J. 2010. Achieving Knowledge, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Kelp, C. 2011. What's the Point of 'Knowledge' Anyway?, Episteme 8/1: 53-66.
5. Kelp, C. 2012. How to Motivate Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology, manuscript.
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11. Pritchard, D. forthcoming. Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology, The Journal of Philosophy.
12. Pritchard, D., A. Millar, and A. Haddock 2010. The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
13. Riggs, W. 2009. Two Problems of Easy Credit, Synthese 169/1: 201-16.
14. Sosa, E. 2007. A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge, Vol. 1, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
15. Sosa, E. 2010. How Competence Matters in Epistemology, Philosophical Perspectives 24/1: 465-75.
16. Williamson, T. 2000. Knowledge and Its Limits, Oxford: Oxford University Press.