Humans display a 'cooperative phenotype' that is domain general and temporally stable

Nature Communications

Volumn 5, Issue , 2014, Pages

  Peysakhovich, Alexander ^a   Nowak, Martin A ^b,c   Rand, David G ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; PHENOTYPIC PLASTICITY;

ARTICLE; COMPETITION; COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR; COOPERATION; CORRELATION ANALYSIS; DECISION MAKING; EVOLUTION; GAME; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; NATURAL SELECTION; NORMAL HUMAN; PHENOTYPE; PSYCHOLOGY; PUNISHMENT; SELF REPORT; HUMAN RELATION; STATISTICAL MODEL; TIME;

BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, STATISTICAL; PHENOTYPE; PUNISHMENT; TIME FACTORS;

EID: 84921270664     PISSN: None     EISSN: 20411723     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/ncomms5939     Document Type: Article

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