Cooperating with the future

Nature

Volumn 511, Issue 7508, 2014, Pages 220-223

  Hauser, Oliver P ^a,b   Rand, David G ^c   Peysakhovich, Alexander ^a,c   Nowak, Martin A ^a,b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DECISION MAKING; EXPLOITATION; GROUP BEHAVIOR; PARADIGM SHIFT; PUBLIC GOODS; RENEWABLE RESOURCE; SUSTAINABILITY; WELFARE REFORM;

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; FUTUROLOGY; HUMAN; HUMAN EXPERIMENT; NORMAL HUMAN; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RESOURCE MANAGEMENT;

COMPUTER SIMULATION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; DECISION MAKING; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS; POLITICS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

EID: 84904167570     PISSN: 00280836     EISSN: 14764687     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1038/nature13530     Document Type: Article

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