Punishment can promote defection in group-structured populations

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 311, Issue , 2012, Pages 107-116

  Powers, Simon T ^a   Taylor, Daniel J ^a   Bryson, Joanna J ^a  

^a University of Bath   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Anti social punishment; Behavioural economics; Equilibrium selection; Public goods; Strong reciprocity

Indexed keywords

ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR; EQUILIBRIUM; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PUBLIC GOODS;

ANTISOCIAL BEHAVIOR; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; DEMOGRAPHY; GROUP STRUCTURED POPULATION; MATHEMATICAL COMPUTING; POPULATION; POPULATION DISPERSION; POPULATION DYNAMICS; POPULATION SIZE; POPULATION STRUCTURE; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PUNISHMENT;

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; MODELS, THEORETICAL; PUNISHMENT; SOCIAL ISOLATION; SOCIAL MARGINALIZATION;

EID: 84864561707     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.07.010     Document Type: Article

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