The political mobilization of firms and industries

Annual Review of Sociology

Volumn 40, Issue , 2014, Pages 281-304

  Walker, Edward T ^a   Rea, Christopher M ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Business; Elites; Industry; Politics; Power; Social movements

Indexed keywords

EID: 84905274697     PISSN: 03600572     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1146/annurev-soc-071913-043215     Document Type: Review

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