Berle and Means revisited: The governance and power of large U.S. corporations

Theory and Society

Volumn 33, Issue 5, 2004, Pages 579-617

  Mizruchi, Mark S ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 24144434030     PISSN: 03042421     EISSN: 15737853     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:RYSO.0000045757.93910.ed     Document Type: Review

References (173)

1. Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, [1932] 1968).
2. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance 54 (1999): 471-517.
3. For an attempt at such a treatment, see Paul Windolf, Corporate Networks in Europe and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
4. Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1959);
5. John Scott, Corporations, Classes, and Capitalism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).
6. For a comparative discussion of the relation between national financial systems and corporate control in France, Germany, Japan, and the U.K., see Linda Brewster Stearns and Mark S. Mizruchi, "Banking and Financial Markets" in Neil J. Smelser and Richard Swedberg, editors, Handbook of Economic Sociology, second edition (New York and Princeton: Russell Sage Foundation and Princeton University Press, in press).
7. Daniel Bell, The End of Ideology (New York: Collier, 1960);
8. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict;
9. Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies (New York: Free Press, 1960).
10. Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York: Harper & Row, 1942);
11. Seymour Martin Lipset, "Introduction" in Robert Michels, Political Parties (New York: Free Press, 1962), 15-39.
12. Rudolf Hilferding, Finance Capital (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, [1910] 1981).
13. Pujo Committee [U.S. Congress, House Banking and Currency Committee], Investigation of Concentration and Control of Money and Credit (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1913);
14. Louis D. Brandeis, Other Peoples' Money (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1914);
15. Ida Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1905);
16. Alexander Noyes, Forty Years of American Finance (New York: G.P. Putnam, 1909).
17. Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
18. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict, 41.
19. David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1953), 242.
20. Bell, The End of Ideology, 42.
21. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict, 47.
22. See also Talcott Parsons and Neil J. Smelser, Economy and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), 254.
23. Carl Kaysen, "The Social Significance of the Modern Corporation," American Economic Review' 47 (1957): 311-319.
24. For a discussion of the sales maximization hypothesis, see William J. Baumol, Business Behavior, Value, and Growth (New York: Macmillan, 1959).
25. For a focus on the significance of growth, see John Kenneth Galbraith, The New Industrial State (New York: New American Library, 1967).
26. For a model that deals with a number of possible managerial motives, see Robin L. Marris, The Economic Theory of Managerial Capitalism (London: Macmillan, 1964).
27. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict, 46.
28. Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, The American Occupational Structure (New York: Free Press, 1967), 6.
29. R. Joseph Monsen, John S. Chiu, and David E. Cooley, "The Effect of Separation of Ownership and Control on the Performance of the Large Firm," Quarterly Journal of Economics 82 (1968): 435-451 ;
30. John Palmer, "The Profit-Performance Effects of the Separation of Ownership from Control in Large United States Corporations," Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 4 (1973): 293-303;
31. David R. Kamerschen, "The Influence of Ownership and Control on Profit Rates," American Economic Review 58 (1968): 432-447.
32. Robert J. Lamer, Management Control and the Large Corporation (New York: Dunellen, 1970).
33. David R. James and Michael Soref, "Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy: Managerial Theory and the Unmaking of the Corporation President, " American Sociological Review 46 (1981): 1-18.
34. John Lintner, "The Financing of Corporations," in Edward S. Mason, editor, The Corporation in Modern Society (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 166-201.
35. Linda Brewster Stearns, "Capital Market Effects on External Control of Corporations," Theory and Society 15 (1986): 47-75.
36. Oliver E. Williamson, The Economics of Discretionary Behavior: Managerial Objectives in a Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1964);
37. Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1957).
38. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: Free Press, 1975);
39. Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., Strategy and Structure (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1962).
40. Chandler, The Visible Hand (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).
41. Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure," Journal of Financial Economics 3 (1976): 305-360;
42. Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control," Journal of Law and Economics 26 (1983): 301-325.
43. Paul A. Baran and Paul M. Sweezy, Monopoly Capital (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1966).
44. Victor Perlo, The Empire of High Finance (New York: International Publishers, 1957).
45. Mayer N. Zald, "The Power and Function of Boards of Directors: A Theoretical Synthesis," American Journal of Sociology 75 (1969): 97-111.
46. Peter C. Dooley, "The Interlocking Directorate," American Economic Review 59 (1969): 314-323.
47. Philip H. Burch, Jr., The Managerial Revolution Reassessed (Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath, 1972).
48. Maurice Zeitlin, "Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class," American Journal of Sociology 79 (1974): 1073-1119.
49. Larner, Management Control.
50. Robert J. Sheehan, "Proprietors in the World of Big Business," Fortune (June 15, 1967): 178-183, 242.
51. Paul M. Sweezy, "The Decline of the Investment Banker," Antioch Review 1 (1942): 63-68;
52. Perlo, The Empire of High Finance.
53. See Michael Useem, Investor Capitalism (New York: Basic Books, 1996).
54. David M. Kotz, Bank Control of Large Corporations in the United States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).
55. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, 66.
56. Maurice Zeitlin and Richard E. Ratcliff, Landlords and Capitalists: The Dominant Class of Chile (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
57. Lewis Corey, The House of Morgan (New York: G. Howard Watt, 1930), 284.
58. Ibid. John Scott, in a study of the late twentieth century United States, U.K., and other European nations, reached a similar conclusion, suggesting that control was achieved through a "constellation of interests." See Scott, Corporations, Classes, and Capitalism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979).
59. Gerald F. Davis and Michael Useem, "Top Management, Company Directors, and Corporate Control" in Andrew Pettigrew, Howard Thomas, and Richard Whittington, editors, Handbook of Strategy and Management (London: Sage Publications, 2002).
60. See, for example, Joseph E. Stiglitz, "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital," Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 17 (1985): 133-152;
61. Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability," Journal of Financial Economics 62 (2001): 415-452;
62. Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael S. Weisbach, "Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature," Economic Policy Review 9 (2003): 7-26.
63. The Modern Corporation, 196.
64. Ibid., 66.
65. For a review of this literature, see Mark S. Mizruchi, "What Do Interlocks Do? An Analysis, Critique, and Assessment of Research on Interlocking Directorates," Annual Review of Sociology 22 (1996): 271-298.
66. Louis D. Brandeis, Other Peoples' Money (New York: Frederick A. Stokes, 1914).
67. The Sherman Antitrust Law of 1890 prohibited anti-competitive activity among U.S. firms.
68. Brandeis, Other Peoples' Money, 35.
69. Arnold M. Rose, The Power Structure (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 133.
70. Ibid., 92.
71. C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956);
72. Rose, The Power Structure.
73. See, for example, Peter Mariolis, "Interlocking Directorates and Control of Corporations: The Theory of Bank Control," Social Science Quarterly 56 (1975): 425-439;
74. Beth Mintz and Michael Schwartz, The Power Structure of American Business (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985);
75. Mark S. Mizruchi, The American Corporate Network, 1904-1974 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982).
76. The above quote from Brandeis implies that investment bankers controlled not only railroads and industrial corporations but also commercial banks and insurance companies. In the early 1900s, the leading investment bankers, most notably J.P. Morgan, were seen as exercising control over a range of corporations, often through their control of banks and insurance companies. At the time, investment banks were especially powerful because they could hold deposits and therefore fulfill the functions of commercial banks. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 required investment and commercial banks to separate their functions. Investment banks, forced to give up their deposits, lost their primary source of capital, and, according to a number of observers, their power. Even those who argued that financial power continued in the decades following Glass-Steagall therefore focused on commercial banks and insurance companies. In the 1990s, faced with increasing competition from foreign banks, U.S. commercial banks increasingly took on the functions of investment banks. The U.S. Congress overturned the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999. For a discussion of the changing roles of commercial and investment banks during the 1930s, see Mizruchi, The American Corporate Network.
77. Duncan J. Watts, Small Worlds: The Dynamics of Networks Between Order and Randomness (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
78. For illustrations of this point, see Karen S. Cook and Joseph M. Whitmeyer, "Two Approaches to Social Structure: Exchange Theory and Network Analysis," Annual Review of Sociology 18(1992): 109-127;
79. Mark S. Mizruchi and Blyden B. Potts, "Centrality and Power Revisited: Actor Success in Group Decision Making," Social Networks 20 (1998): 353-387.
80. Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1971), 73.
81. Mizruchi, The American Corporate Network.
82. There was some evidence that bankers tended to join the boards of firms experiencing declining profits. For two examples see R. Jack Richardson, "Directorship Interlocks and Corporate Profitability," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 367-386,
83. and Mark S. Mizruchi and Linda Brewster Stearns, "A Longitudinal Study of the Formation of Interlocking Directorates," Administrative Science Quarterly 33 (1988): 194-210.
84. In a study based on data from 1992, however, Kroszner and Strahan found that bankers tended to sit on the boards of large, well-performing firms. This may reflect a change in bank behavior over time. See Randall S. Kroszner and Philip E. Strahan, "Bankers on Boards: Monitoring, Conflicts of Interest, and Lender Liability," Journal of Financial Economics 62: 415-452.
85. See also Gerald F. Davis and Mark S. Mizruchi, "The Money Center Cannot Hold: Commercial Banks in the U.S. System of Corporate Governance," Administrative Science Quarterly 44 (1999): 215-239.
86. Mintz and Schwartz, The Power Structure of American Business.
87. Jay W. Lorsch and Elizabeth MacIver, Pawns or Potentates: The Reality of America's Corporate Boards (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1989).
88. Jeffrey Pfeffer and Gerald R. Salancik, The External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective (New York: Harper & Row, 1978). A paperback edition of the book, with a valuable new introduction, has recently been published by Stanford University Press, 2003.
89. Three studies from the late 1970s and early 1980s indicated that interlocks between firms that were accidentally broken, through death or retirement of the director, were replaced in only a small minority of cases. This raised further questions about whether interlocks reflected control relations between firms. See Thomas Koenig, Robert Gogel, and John Sonquist, "Models of the Significance of Interlocking Corporate Directorates," American Journal of Economics and Sociology 38 (1979): 173-186;
90. Michael D. Ornstein, "Assessing the Meaning of Corporate Interlocks: Canadian Evidence," Social Science Research 9 (1980): 287-306;
91. Donald Palmer, "Broken Ties: Interlocking Directorates, and Intercorporate Coordination," Administrative Science Quarterly 28 (1983): 40-55.
92. Mark S. Mizruchi, "Who Controls Whom? An Examination of the Relation Between Management and Boards of Directors in Large American Corporations," Academy of Management Review 8 (1983): 426-435.
93. Robert A. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model," American Political Science Review 52 (1958): 463-469;
94. Nelson W. Polsby, "How to Study Community Power: The Pluralist Alternative," in Michael Aiken and Paul Mott, editors, The Structure of Community Power (New York: Random House), 297-304.
95. For an exceptionally clear presentation of this position, see Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (New York: Macmillan, 1974).
96. Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz, "The Two Faces of Power," American Political Science Review 56 (1962): 947-952.
97. Mills, The Power Elite.
98. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality, 124.
99. Douglas Bauer, "Why Big Business is Firing the Boss," New York Times Magazine (March 8, 1981): 22-25, 79-91.
100. James and Soref, "Profit Constraints on Managerial Autonomy."
101. The scandals at Enron and other U.S. companies at the turn of the twenty-first century appear to call into question the board's ability to monitor management. Similar cases have occurred in earlier years, most notably the bankruptcy of the Penn Central Railroad in 1970, when Penn Central's board members were lulled, by management and its accountants, into believing that the company was on a strong financial footing. At this writing we do not know the extent to which Enron's board members were aware of the accounting improprieties allegedly perpetrated by CEO Kenneth Lay and the firm's auditor, Arthur Andersen & Co., although the board has denied any knowledge of them. These events illustrate, as agency theorists suggest, that the board's monitoring of management is always problematic and cannot be taken for granted. They do not by themselves indicate that boards are incapable of such monitoring, however. Moreover, the fact that the Enron episode occurred when it did is actually consistent with the argument presented here. When the economy is strong and firms are performing well, the board has less need to monitor management, and managers may find it easier to take liberties in ways that they would not otherwise be able to do. It is possible, and perhaps even likely, that significant numbers of similar kinds of actions were taking place during the boom of the late-1990s, many of which did not come to the surface because companies continued to perform well. Once the boom ended, it was no longer possible to hide such behavior, and managers again became vulnerable, although as in the Enron case, boards did not always react in time to save the firm.
102. James W. Fredrickson, Donald C. Hambrick, and Sara Baumrin, "A Model of CEO Dismissal" Academy of Management Review 13 (1987): 255-270.
103. Barry Baysinger and Robert E. Hoskisson, "The Composition of Boards of Directors and Strategic Control: Effects on Corporate Strategy," Academy of Management Review 15 (1990): 72-87;
104. James P. Walsh and James K. Seward, "On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms," Academy of Management Review 15 (1990): 421-458.
105. Mizruchi, "What Do Interlocks Do?"
106. Rita D. Kosnik, "Greenmail: A Study of Board Performance in Corporate Governance," Administrative Science Quarterly 32 (1987): 163-185.
107. Philip L. Cochran, Robert A. Wood, and Thomas B. Jones, "The Composition of Boards of Directors and Incidence of Golden Parachutes," Academy of Management Journal 28 (1985):664-671;
108. Harbir Singh and Farid Harianto, "Management-Board Relationships, Takeover Risk, and the Adoption of Golden Parachutes," Academy of Management Journal 32 (1989): 7-24.
109. James Wade, Charles A. O'Reilly, III, and Ike Chandratat, "Golden Parachutes: CEOs and the Exercise of Social Influence," Administrative Science Quarterly 35 (1990): 587-603.
110. Other relevant studies of board structure and behavior include Edward J. Zajac and James D. Westphal, "Director Reputation, CEO-board Power, and the Dynamics of Board Interlocks," Administrative Science Quarterly 41 (1996): 507-529;
111. James D. Westphal and Edward J. Zajac, "Defections from the Inner Circle: Social Exchange, Reciprocity, and the Diffusion of Board Independence in U.S. Corporations," Administrative Science Quarterly 42 (1997): 161-183;
112. Albert A. Cannella, Jr. and Wei Shen, "So Close and Yet So Far: Promotion versus Exit for CEO Heirs Apparent," Academy of Management Journal 44 (2001): 252-270.
113. Three additional works demonstrate that the structure of a firm's board influences the level and type of financing it receives. See Linda Brewster Stearns and Mark S. Mizruchi, "Board Composition and Corporate Financing: The Impact of Financial Institution Representation on Borrowing," Academy of Management Journal 36 (1993): 603-618;
114. Mark S. Mizruchi and Linda Brewster Stearns, "A Longitudinal Study of Borrowing by Large American Corporations," Administrative Science Quarterly 39 (1994): 118-140;
115. Daniel T. Byrd and Mark S. Mizruchi, "Bankers on the Board and the Debt Ratio of Firms," Journal of Corporate Finance (in press).
116. Gerald F. Davis, "Agents Without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network," Administrative Science Quarterly 36 (1991): 583-613.
117. Pamela R. Haunschild, "Interorganizational Imitation: The Impact of Interlocks on Corporate Acquisition Activity," Administrative Science Quarterly 38(1993): 564-592.
118. Mark S. Mizruchi, "Similarity of Political Behavior Among Large American Corporations," American Journal of Sociology 95 (1989): 401-424.
119. Donald Palmer, Brad M. Barber, Xueguang Zhou, and Yasmin Soysal, "The Friendly and Predatory Acquisition of Large U.S. Corporations in the 1960s: The Other Contested Terrain," American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 469-499.
120. See also Donald Palmer and Brad M. Barber, "Challengers, Elites, and Owning Families: A Social Class Theory of Corporate Acquisitions in the 1960s," Administrative Science Quarterly 46 (2001): 87-120.
121. Gerald F. Davis and Suzanne K. Stout, "Organization Theory and the Market for Corporate Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover Targets, 1980-1990," Administrative Science Quarterly 37(1992): 605-633;
122. Neil Fligstein and Peter Brantley, "Bank Control, Owner Control, or Organizational Dynamics: Who Controls the Large Modern Corporation?" American Journal of Sociology 98 (1992): 280-307;
123. Neil Fligstein and Linda Markowitz, "Financial Reorganization of American Corporations in the 1980s," in William Julius Wilson, editor, Sociology and the Public Agenda (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1993), 185-206.
124. Useem, Investor Capitalism.
125. Davis and Useem, "Top Management, Company Directors, and Corporate Control."
126. Hilferding, Finance Capital;
127. VI. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Peking [Beijing]: Foreign Languages Press, [1917] 1975).
128. Kotz, Bank Control of Large Corporations.
129. Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, "Who Rules the Corporations?" Socialist Revolution 1 (1970) (4): 73-108;
130. Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, "Who Rules the Corporations?" Socialist Revolution 1 (1970) (5): 61-114;
131. Robert Fitch and Mary Oppenheimer, "Who Rules the Corporations?" Socialist Revolution 1 (1970) (6): 33-94.
132. Paul M. Sweezy, "The Resurgence of Financial Control: Fact or Fancy?" in Sweezy and Harry Magdoff, The Dynamics of U.S. Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1972);
133. James O'Connor, "Question: Who Rules the Corporations? Answer: The Ruling Class," Socialist Revolution 7 (1972): 117-150.
134. Edward S. Herman, Corporate Control, Corporate Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
135. Mintz and Schwartz, The Power Structure of American Business.
136. Stiglitz, "Credit Markets and the Control of Capital."
137. Davis and Mizruchi, "The Money Center Cannot Hold."
138. Mark S. Mizruchi and Gerald F. Davis, "The Globalization of American Banking, 1962-1981," in Frank Dobbin, editor, The Sociology of the Economy (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2004), 95-126.
139. Mark S. Mizruchi and Linda Brewster Stearns, "Getting Deals Done: The Use of Social Networks in Bank Decision-Making," American Sociological Review 66 (2001): 647-671.
140. Davis and Mizruchi, "The Money Center Cannot Hold."
141. Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation, 313.
142. Robert A. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961).
143. Raymond A. Bauer, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Lewis Anthony Dexter, American Business and Foreign Policy: The Politics of Foreign Trade (New York: Atherton Press, [1963] 1972).
144. G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1967);
145. Peter Freitag, "The Cabinet and Big Business: A Study of Interlocks," Social Problems 23 (1975): 137-152.
146. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy;
147. Lipset, "Introduction," in Michels, Political Parties.
148. Edward O. Laumann and David Knoke, The Organizational State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987).
149. Michael Useem, The Inner Circle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).
150. J. Allen Whitt, Urban Elites and Mass Transportation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).
151. See also Dan Clawson, Alan Neustadtl, and Denise Scott, Money Talks: Corporate PACs and Political Influence (New York: Basic Books, 1992).
152. Mark S. Mizruchi, The Structure of Corporate Political Action: Interfirm Relations and their Consequences (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992).
153. Davis and Mizruchi, "The Money Center Cannot Hold."
154. For exceptions, see Michael C. Dreiling, "The Class Embeddedness of Corporate Political Action: Leadership in Defense of the NAFTA," Social Problems 47 (2000): 21-48;
155. Harland Prechel, Big Business and the State: Historical Transitions and Corporate Transformation, 1880s-1990s (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000);
156. Val Burris, "The Two Faces of Capital: Corporations and Individual Capitalists as Political Actors," American Sociological Review 66 (2001): 361-381.
157. G. William Domhoff, Who Rules America? Power and Politics in the Year 2000 (Mountain View, CA: Mayfield, 1998).
158. Useem, Investor Capitalism.
159. Useem, Investor Capitalism, 267-269.
160. Gerald F. Davis, "Financial Markets and Classes in Late Capitalism," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Management (Chicago, 1999).
161. Davis and Mizruchi, "The Money Center Cannot Hold."
162. Jeffry Frieden, "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," International Organization 45 (1991): 425-451;
163. Susan Strange, The Retreat of the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
164. Philip G. Cerny, "International Finance and the Erosion of Capitalist Diversity," in Colin Crouch and Wolfgang Streeck, editors, Political Economy of Modern Capitalism (London: Sage Publications, 1997), 173-181.
165. See Neil Fligstein, The Architecture of Markets (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
166. For a recent comparative analysis of interfirm networks in the United States and Europe, see Paul Windolf, Corporate Networks in Europe and the United States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
167. See, among others, J. Craig Jenkins and Craig Eckert, "The Corporate Elite, The New Conservative Policy Network, and Reaganomics," Critical Sociology 16 (1989) (2-3): 121-144;
168. David Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes: The Political Power of Business in America (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
169. Vogel, Fluctuating Fortunes.
170. Dahl, "A Critique of the Ruling Elite Model."
171. Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society;
172. John Kenneth Galbraith, American Capitalism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952).
173. Please direct correspondence to Mark Mizruchi, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan, 1225 S. University Ave., Ann Arbor, MI, 48104-2590, phone (734) 764-7444, e-mail: mizruchi@umich.edu.