Quiet politics and business power: Corporate control in Europe and Japan

Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 1-221

  Culpepper, Pepper D ^a  

^a EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE   (Italy)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85010402893     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511760716     Document Type: Book

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