The interlock structure of the policy-planning network and the right turn in U.S. state policy

Research in Political Sociology

Volumn 17, Issue , 2008, Pages 3-42

  Burris, Val ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 77950708872     PISSN: 08959935     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S0895-9935(08)17002-4     Document Type: Review

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