Subsidizing to disrupt a terrorism supply chain-A four-player game

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Volumn 65, Issue 7, 2014, Pages 1108-1119

  Shan, Xiaojun ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^a  

^a State University of New York   (United States)

Author keywords

game theory; homeland security; subsidy; terrorism supply chain; weapons of mass destruction

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; MILITARY EQUIPMENT; NATIONAL SECURITY; SECURITY SYSTEMS; SUPPLY CHAINS;

BLACK MARKET; GAME-THEORETIC; GOVERNMENT DECISIONS; POLICY MAKING; SUBSIDY; TERRORIST ACTIVITIES; TERRORIST GROUPS; WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTIONS;

TERRORISM;

EID: 84902157910     PISSN: 01605682     EISSN: 14769360     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/jors.2013.53     Document Type: Article

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