Counterterrorism: A game-theoretic analysis

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 49, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 183-200

  Arce M , Daniel G ^a   Sandler, Todd ^b  

^a RHODES COLLEGE   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Counterterrorism; Deterrence; Nash equilibrium; Noncooperative game; Preemption; Terrorism

Indexed keywords

EID: 15844375473     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002704272863     Document Type: Article

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