Hybrid defensive resource allocations in the face of partially strategic attackers in a sequential defender-Attacker game

European Journal of Operational Research

Volumn 228, Issue 1, 2013, Pages 262-272

  Shan, Xiaojun ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

Attacker defender game; Game theory; Homeland security; Non strategic player; Partially strategic player; Resource allocation

Indexed keywords

ATTACKER-DEFENDER GAME; EXPECTED LOSS; GAME-THEORETIC MODEL; HOME LAND SECURITY; HYBRID MODEL; NON-STRATEGIC PLAYER; PARTIALLY STRATEGIC PLAYER; POTENTIAL TARGETS;

GAME THEORY; NATIONAL SECURITY; PROBABILITY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY SYSTEMS;

TERRORISM;

EID: 84875228984     PISSN: 03772217     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejor.2013.01.029     Document Type: Article

References (45)

1. M.N. Azaiez, and V.M. Bier Optimal resource allocation for security in reliability systems European Journal of Operational Research 181 2 2007 773 786
2. M. Baveja, and L.M. Wein An effective two-finger, two-stage biometric strategy for the US-VISIT program Operations Research 57 5 2009 1068 1081
3. O. Berman, and A. Gavious Location of terror response facilities: a game between state and terrorist European Journal of Operational Research 177 2 2007 1113 1133
4. V.M. Bier, N. Haphuriwat, J. Menoyo, R. Zimmerman, and A.M. Culpen Optimal resource allocation for defense of targets based on differing measures of attractiveness Risk Analysis 28 3 2008 763 770
5. G. Brown, M. Carlyle, D. Diehl, J. Kline, and K. Wood A two-sided optimization for theater ballistic missile defense Operations Research 53 5 2005 263 275
6. L.A. Cox Game theory and risk analysis Risk Analysis 29 8 2009 1062 1068
7. de Rugy, V.; 2005. Homeland-Security Pork. Washington Times. < http://www.aei.org/article/22924 > (accessed 08.12).
8. M. Dresher Games of Strategy - Theory and Application 1961 Prentice-Hall Englewood Cliffs, NJ
9. M. Golalikhani, and J. Zhuang Modeling arbitrary layers of continuous-level defenses in facing with strategic attackers Risk Analysis 31 4 2011 533 547
10. B. Golany, E.H. Kaplan, A. Marmur, and U.G. Rothblum Nature plays with dice-terrorists do not: allocating resources to counter strategic versus probabilistic risks European Journal of Operational Research 192 1 2009 198 208
11. J.R. Hall The elephant in the room is called game theory Risk Analysis 29 8 2009 1061
12. Hao, M.; Zhuang, J.; Jin, S.; 2009. Robustness of optimal defensive resource allocations in the face of less fully rational attacker. In: Proceedings of the 2009 Industrial Engineering Research Conference, pp. 886-891.
13. N. Haphuriwat, and V.M. Bier Trade-offs between target hardening and overarching protection European Journal of Operational Research 213 1 2011 320 328
14. B. Harris Mathematical methods in combating terrorism Risk Analysis 24 4 2004 985 988
15. K. Hausken Strategic defense and attack for series and parallel reliability systems European Journal of Operational Research 186 2 2008 856 881
16. K. Hausken, and J. Zhuang The impact of disaster on the interaction between company and government European Journal of Operational Research in press 2012
17. J. Hu, T. Homem-de, Mello, and S. Mehrotra Risk adjusted budget allocation models with application in homeland security IIE Transactions 43 12 2011 819 839
18. M. Jain, J. Tsai, J. Pita, C. Kiekintveld, S. Rathi, F. Ordonez, and M. Tambe Software assistants for randomized patrol planning for the lax patrol police and the federal air marshals service Interfaces 40 4 2010 267 290
19. E.H. Kaplan Terror queues Operations Research 58 4 2010 773 784
20. E.H. Kaplan, and M. Kress Operational effectiveness of suicide-bomber-detector schemes: a best-case analysis Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 102 29 2005 10399 10404
21. E.H. Kaplan, M. Kress, and R. Szechtman Confronting entrenched insurgents Operations Research 58 2 2010 329 341
22. G.L. Keeney, and D. von Winterfeldt A value model for evaluating homeland security decisions Risk Analysis 31 9 2011 1470 1487
23. R.L. Keeney Modeling values for anti-terrorism analysis Risk Analysis 27 3 2007 585 596
24. D.M. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma Journal of Economic Theory 27 2 1982 245 252
25. M. Kress, and R. Szechtman Why defeating insurgencies is hard: the effect of intelligence in counterinsurgency operations - a best case scenario Operations Research 57 3 2009 578 585
26. G. Levitin, and K. Hausken Redundancy vs. protection in defending parallel systems against unintentional and intentional impacts IEEE Transactions on Reliability 58 4 2009 679 690
27. K.Y. Lin, M. Kress, and R. Szechtman Scheduling policies for an antiterrorist surveillance system Naval Research Logistics 56 2 2009 113 126
28. McLaughlin, A.; 2002. Homeland Security - Pork or Protection? The Christian Science Monitor. < http://www.csmonitor.com/2002/0306/p03s01-usmi. html > (accessed 08.12).
29. O'Beirne, K.; 2003. Introducing Pork-Barrel Homeland Security: A Little Here, A Lot There. Puerto Rico Herald. < http://www.puertorico-herald.org/ issues/2003/vol7n43/IntroPork-en.html > (accessed 08.12).
30. R. Powell Defending against terrorist attacks with limited resources American Political Science Review 101 3 2007 527 541
31. R. Powell Sequential, nonzero-sum "Blotto": allocating defensive resources prior to attack Games and Economic Behavior 67 2 2009 611 615
32. B. Roberson The colonel blotto game Economic Theory 29 1 2006 1 24
33. T. Sandler, and K. Siqueira Games and terrorism: recent developments Simulation & Gaming 40 2 2009 164 192
34. M. Shubik, and R.J. Weber Systems defense games: Colonel Blotto, command and control Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 28 2 1981 281 287
35. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2004. Fiscal Year 2004 Urban Areas Security Initiative Grant Program. < http://web.archive.org/web/*/http: //www.ojp.usdoj.gov/odp/docs/fy04uasi.pdf > (accessed 08.12).
36. U.S. Department of Homeland Security. 2012. Budget and Performance. < http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/budget/dhs-budget.shtm > (accessed 08.12).
37. U.S. Government Accountability Office. 2008. DHS Risk-Based Grant Methodology is Reasonable, but Current Versions Measure of Vulnerability is Limited. < http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08852.pdf > (accessed 08.12).
38. Veinott, A.; 1992. Lattice Programming: Qualitative optimization and equilibria. Mimeo. Stanford University.
39. C. Wang, and V.M. Bier Target-hardening decisions based on uncertain multiattribute terrorist utility Decision Analysis 8 4 2011 286 302
40. X. Wang, and J. Zhuang Balancing congestion and security in the presence of strategic applicants with private information European Journal of Operational Research 212 1 2011 100 111
41. L.M. Wein Homeland security: From mathematical models to policy implementation: the 2008 Philip McCord Morse lecture Operations Research 57 4 2009 801 811
42. Willis, H.H.; Morral, A.R.; Kelly, T.K.; Medby, J.J.; 2005. Estimating Terrorism Risk. < http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND-MG388.pdf > (accessed 08.12).
43. J. Zhuang Impacts of subsidized security on stability and total social costs of equilibrium solutions in an n-player game with error The Engineering Economist 55 2 2010 131 149
44. J. Zhuang, and V.M. Bier Balancing terrorism and natural disasters - defensive strategy with endogenous attacker effort Operations Research 55 5 2007 976 991
45. J. Zhuang, V.M. Bier, and O. Alagoz Modeling secrecy and deception in a multiple-period attacker-defender signaling game European Journal of Operational Research 203 2 2010 409 418