Terrorist spectaculars: Backlash attacks and the focus of intelligence

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 54, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 354-373

  Arce, Daniel G ^a   Sandler, Todd ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

Author keywords

Backlash attacks; Counterterrorism; Signaling games; Terrorist spectaculars; Value of intelligence

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952006728     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: 15528766     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002709355414     Document Type: Article

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