The timing and deterrence of terrorist attacks due to exogenous dynamics

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Volumn 63, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 726-735

  Hausken, K ^a   Zhuang, J ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

^b State University of New York   (United States)

Author keywords

terrorism; terror capacity; threat; conflict; dynamics; contest success function

Indexed keywords

DYNAMICS; RESOURCE VALUATION; TIMING CIRCUITS;

ASSET VALUATION; CONTEST SUCCESS FUNCTION; COUNTER TERRORISM; CRITICAL COMPONENT; RANDOM DYNAMICS; TERRORIST ATTACKS; TWO STAGE GAMES;

TERRORISM;

EID: 84860829757     PISSN: 01605682     EISSN: 14769360     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/jors.2011.79     Document Type: Article

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