Cost of equity in homeland security resource allocation in the face of a strategic attacker

Risk Analysis

Volumn 33, Issue 6, 2013, Pages 1083-1099

  Shan, Xiaojun ^a   Zhuang, Jun ^a  

^a The State University of New York ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

Attack defender games; Equity; Game theory; Homeland security; Resource allocation

Indexed keywords

ADAPTIVE ADVERSARY; ATTACK-DEFENDER GAMES; EQUITY; EQUITY AND EFFICIENCIES; GEOGRAPHICAL AREA; HOME LAND SECURITY; POTENTIAL TARGETS; STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS;

BUDGET CONTROL; COSTS; GAME THEORY; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; NATIONAL SECURITY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; TERRORISM;

SECURITY SYSTEMS;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; DEFENSE SPENDING; EQUITY; GAME THEORY; NUMERICAL MODEL; POLICY MAKING; PROBABILITY; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; TERRORISM;

ARTICLE; BUDGET; ECONOMICS; ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; UNITED STATES;

BUDGETS; RESOURCE ALLOCATION; SECURITY MEASURES; UNITED STATES;

EID: 84879105460     PISSN: 02724332     EISSN: 15396924     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2012.01919.x     Document Type: Article

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