Modelling contracts between a terrorist group and a government in a sequential game

Journal of the Operational Research Society

Volumn 63, Issue 6, 2012, Pages 790-809

  He, F ^a   Zhuang, J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY AT BUFFALO   (United States)

Author keywords

contracts; Game theory; Homeland security; Preferences for rent; Sequential game; Target valuations

Indexed keywords

CONTRACTS; GAME THEORY; NATIONAL SECURITY;

EQUILIBRIUM SOLUTIONS; INCOMPLETE INFORMATION; PREFERENCES FOR RENT; SEQUENTIAL GAMES; TARGET VALUATIONS; TERRORIST GROUPS;

TERRORISM;

EID: 84860816402     PISSN: 01605682     EISSN: 14769360     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1057/jors.2011.49     Document Type: Article

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