Act Individuation: An Experimental Approach

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 2012, Pages 249-262

  Ulatowski, Joseph ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84873268445     PISSN: 18785158     EISSN: 18785166     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s13164-012-0096-1     Document Type: Article

References (41)

1. Adams, F., and A. Steadman. 2004a. Intentional action in ordinary language: Core concept or pragmatic understanding. Analysis 74: 173-181.
2. Adams, F., and A. Steadman. 2004b. Intentional actions and moral considerations: Still pragmatic. Analysis 74: 264-267.
3. Anscombe, G. E. M. 2001. Intention. Harvard University Press.
4. Cushman, F., and A. Mele. 2008. Intentional action: Two-and-a-half folk concepts? In Experimental philosophy, ed. J. Knobe and S. Nichols. New York: Oxford University Press.
5. Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, reasons, and causes. Reprinted in Davidson 2001: 3-19.
6. Davidson, D. 1969. The individuation of events. Reprinted in Davidson 2001: 163-180.
7. Davidson, D. 1971. Agency. Reprinted in Davidson 2001: 43-61.
8. Davidson, D. 2001. Essays on action and events. Oxford: Clarendon.
9. Feltz, A., and E. Cokely. 2007. An anomaly in intentional action ascription: More evidence of folk diversity. In Proceedings of the 29th annual meeting of cognitive science society, ed. D. S. McNamara and G. Trafton. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum.
10. Goldman, A. 1970. A theory of human action. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
11. Goldman, A. 1971. The individuation of action. Journal of Philosophy 68: 761-774.
12. Goldman, A. 2007. A program for "naturalizing" metaphysics, with application to the ontology of events. The Monist 90: 457-479.
13. Hindriks, F. 2008. Intentional action and the praise-blame asymmetry. The Philosophical Quarterly 58: 630-641.
14. Hornsby, J. 1979. Actions and identities. Analysis 39: 195-201.
15. Jones, O. R. 1964. Identity and countability. Analysis 24: 201-206.
16. Kim, J. 1969. Events and their descriptions: Some considerations. In Essays in honor of Carl G. Hempel, ed. N. Rescher, 198-215. Dordrecht: Reidel.
17. Kim, J. 1976. Events as property exemplifications. In Action theory, ed. M. Brand and D. Walton, 159-177. Dordrecht: Reidel.
18. Knobe, J. 2003. Intentional action and side-effects in ordinary language. Analysis 63: 190-193.
19. Leslie, A., J. Knobe, and A. Cohen. 2006. Acting intentionally and the side-effect effect: 'Theory of mind' and moral judgment. Psychological Science 17: 421-427.
20. Machery, E. 2008. The folk concept of intentional action: Philosophical and experimental issues. Mind and Language 23: 165-189.
21. Malle, B. 2001. Folk explanations of intentional action. In Intentions and intentionality: Foundations of social cognition, eds. B. F. Malle, L. J. Moses, and D. A. Baldwin, 265-286. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
22. Malle, B. 2006. The relation between judgments of intentionality and morality. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6: 61-86.
23. Malle, B., and J. Knobe. 1997. The folk concept of intentionality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33: 101-121.
24. Mallon, R. 2008. Knobe vs Machery: Testing the trade-off hypothesis. Mind and Language 23: 247-255.
25. McCann, H. 2005. Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical studies. Philosophical Psychology 18: 737-748.
26. McCullagh, C. 1976. The individuation of actions and acts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 54: 133-139.
27. Meeks, R. 2004. Unintentionally biasing the data: Reply to Knobe. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 220-223.
28. Nadelhoffer, T. 2004a. The Butler problem revisited. Analysis 64: 277-284.
29. Nadelhoffer, T. 2004b. Praise, side effects, and intentional action. The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 196-213.
30. Nadelhoffer, T. 2004c. Blame, badness, and intentional action: A reply to Knobe and Mendlow. The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 259-269.
31. Nado, J. 2008. Effects of moral cognition on judgments of intentionality. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59: 709-731.
32. Nanay, B. 2010. Morality or modality? What does the attribution of intentionality depend on? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40: 28-40.
33. Nichols, S., and J. Ulatowski. 2007. Intuitions and individual differences: The Knobe effect revisited. Mind and Language 22: 346-365.
34. Phelan, M., and H. Sarkissian. 2008. The folk strike back: Or, why you don't do it intentionally, though it was bad and you knew it. Philosophical Studies 138: 291-298.
35. Phelan, M., and H. Sarkissian. 2009. Is the 'trade-off hypothesis' worth trading for? Mind and Language 24: 164-180.
36. Sripada, C. 2010. The deep self model and asymmetries in folk judgments about intentional action. Philosophical Studies 151: 159-176.
37. Turner, J. 2004. Folk intuitions, asymmetry, and intentional side effects. The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24: 214-219.
38. Wiggins, D. 2001. Sameness and substance renewed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
39. Wiland, E. 2007. Intentional action and 'in order to'. The Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27: 113-118.
40. Wright, J., and J. Bengson. 2009. Asymmetries in folk judgments of responsibility and intentional action. Mind and Language 24: 24-50.
41. Young, L., F. Cushman, R. Adolphs, D. Tranel, and M. Hauser. 2006. Does emotion mediate the relationship between an action's moral status and its intentional status? Neuropsychological evidence. Journal of Cognition and Culture 6: 291-304.