Philosophy's New Challenge: Experiments and Intentional Action

Mind and Language

Volumn 26, Issue 1, 2011, Pages 115-139

  Pinillos, N Ángel ^a   Smith, Nick ^a   Nair, G Shyam ^b   Marchetto, Peter ^c   Mun, Cecilea ^a  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 78651415457     PISSN: 02681064     EISSN: 14680017     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2010.01412.x     Document Type: Article

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