Black-box randomized reductions in algorithmic mechanism design

SIAM Journal on Computing

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2014, Pages 312-336

  Dughmi, Shaddin ^a   Roughgarden, Tim ^b  

^a University of Southern California   (United States)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Algorithmic mechanism design; Black box reductions; Smoothed analysis

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; BLACK-BOX REDUCTIONS; FULLY POLYNOMIAL TIME APPROXIMATION SCHEMES; OPTIMIZATION PROBLEMS; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; RANDOMIZED REDUCTIONS; SMOOTHED ANALYSIS; TRUTHFUL APPROXIMATION;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 84896984382     PISSN: 00975397     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1137/110843654     Document Type: Conference Paper

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