Single-value combinatorial auctions and algorithmic implementation in undominated strategies

Journal of the ACM

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 2009, Pages

  Babaioff, Moshe ^a   Lavi, Ron ^b   Pavlov, Elan ^c  

^a MICROSOFT RESEARCH   (United States)

^b TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

^c MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Incentives; Mechanism design; Undominated strategies

Indexed keywords

ALLOCATION PROBLEMS; APPROXIMATION RATIOS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISMS; DETERMINISTIC TECHNIQUES; DOMINANT STRATEGIES; INCENTIVES; MECHANISM DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; PRIVATE INFORMATIONS; RATIONAL BEHAVIORS; SINGLE VALUES; SOCIAL WELFARES; UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMMERCE; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

MACHINE DESIGN;

EID: 60349087884     PISSN: 00045411     EISSN: 1557735X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1145/1462153.1462157     Document Type: Article

References (34)

1. AKCOGLU, K., ASPENS, J., DASGUPTA, B., AND KAO, M. 2002. An opportunity-cost algorithm for combinatorial auctions. In Applied Optimization: Computational Methods in Decision-Making, Economics, and Finance, E. J. Kontoghiorghes, B. Rustem, and S. Siokos, Eds. Kluwer Academic.
2. ARCHER, A., AND TARDOS, É. 2001. Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents. In Proceedings of the 42nd IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Sciences (FOCS). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 482-491.
3. AWERBUCH, B., AZAR, Y, AND MEYERSON, A. 2003. Reducing truth-telling online mechanisms to online optimization. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). ACM, New York, 503-510.
4. BABAIOFF, M., LAVI, R., AND PAVLOV, E. 2005. Mechanism design for single-value domains. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI), 241-247.
5. BABAIOFF, M., LAVI, R., AND PAVLOV, E. 2006. Impersonation-based mechanisms. In Proceedings of the National Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI).
6. BARTAL, Y, GONEN, R., AND NISAN, N. 2003. Incentive compatible multi-unit combinatorial auctions. In TARK. 72-87.
7. BLUMROSEN, L., AND NLSAN, N. 2005. On the computational power of iterative auctions. In Proceedings of 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC). ACM, New York, 29-43
8. BLUMROSEN, L., AND NISAN, N. 2007. Combinatorial auctions. In Algorithmic Game Theory, N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, AND V. Vazirani, Eds. Cambridge University press, Cambridge, UK.
9. BRIEST, P., KRYSTA, P., AND VOCKING, B, 2005. Approximation techniques for utilitarian mechanism design. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). ACM, New York, 39-48.
10. CLARKE, E. H. 1971. Multipart pricing of public goods. Public Choice, 17-33.
11. CRAMTON, P., SHOHAM, Y., AND STEINBERG, R., EDS. 2006. Combinatorial Auctions. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
12. DOBZINSKI, S. 2007. Two randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In RANDOM-APPROX.
13. DOBZINSKI, S., AND NISAN, N. 2007. Limitations of vcg-based mechanisms. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). ACM, New York.
14. DOBZINSKI, S., NISAN, N., AND SCHAPIRA, M. 2005. Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). ACM, New York, 610-618.
15. DOBZINSKI, S., NISAN, N., AND SCHAPIRA, M. 2006. Truthful randomized mechanisms for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). ACM, New York.
16. DOBZINSKI, S., AND SUNDARARAJAN, M. 2008. On characterizations of truthful mechanisms for combinatorial auctions and scheduling. In Proceedings of the 9th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York.
17. FUJISHIMA, Y, LEYTON-BROWN, K., AND SHOHAM, Y. 1999. Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auctions: Optimal and approximate approaches. In Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI'99). Morgan-Kaufmann, San Francisco, CA.
18. GONEN, R., AND LEHMANN, D. J. 2000. Optimal solutions for multi-unit combinatorial auctions: branch and bound heuristics. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. ACM, New York, 13-20.
19. GROVES, T. 1973. Incentives in teams. Econometrica, 617-631.
20. HOLZMAN, R., KFIR-DAHAV, N., MONDERER, D., AND TENNENHOLTZ, M. 2004. Bundling equilibrium in combinatorial auctions. Games Econ. Beh. 47, 104-123.
21. JACKSON, M. O. 1992. Implementation in undominated strategies: A look at bounded mechanisms. Rev. Econ. Stud.
22. LAVI, R., MUALEM, A., AND NISAN, N. 2003. Towards a characterization of truthful combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 574-583.
23. LAVI, R., AND NISAN, N. 2005. Online ascending auctions for gradually expiring items. In Proceedings of the ACM-SIAM Symposium on Discrete Algorithms (SODA). ACM, New York, 1146-1155.
24. LAVI, R., AND SWAMY, C. 2005. Truthful and near optimal mechanism design via linear programming. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS). IEEE Computer Society Press, Los Alamitos, CA, 595-604.
25. LAVI, R., AND SWAMY, C. 2007. Truthful mechanism design for multidimensional scheduling. In Proceedings of the 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (ACM-EC). ACM, New York.
26. LEHMANN, D., O'CALLAGHAN, L., AND SHOHAM, Y. 2002. Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions. J. ACM 49, 5, 1-26.
27. MU'ALEM, A., AND NISAN, N. 2002. Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the AAAI/IAAI. 379-384.
28. NISAN, N., AND RONEN, A. 2001. Algorithmic mechanism design. Games Econom. Behav. 35, 166-196.
29. NISAN, N., AND SEGAL, I. 2006. The communication requirements of efficient allocations and supporting prices. J. Econ. Theory.
30. NISAN, N., AND ZUREL, E. 2001. An efficient approximate allocation algorithm for combinatorial auctions. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. 125-136.
31. PARKES, D. 2005. Iterative combinatorial auctions. In Combinatorial Auctions, P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg, Eds. MIT press, Cambridge, MA.
32. SANDHOLM, T., SURI, S., GILPIN, A., AND LEVINE, D. 2005. Cabob: A fast optimal algorithm for winner determination in combinatorial auctions. Manage. Sci. 51, 3, 374-390.
33. VICKREY, W. 1961. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders. J. Finance 16, 1, 8-37.
34. ZUCKERMAN, D. 2006. Linear degree extractors and the inapproximability of max clique and chromatic number. In Proceedings of the ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC). ACM, New York, 681-690.