On the power of randomization in algorithmic mechanism design

Proceedings - Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science, FOCS

Volumn , Issue , 2009, Pages 505-514

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Dughmi, Shaddin ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b Stanford University   (United States)

Author keywords

Mechanism design; Truthful approximation algorithms

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMIC MECHANISM DESIGN; APPROXIMATION RATIOS; DETERMINISTIC MECHANISM; MECHANISM DESIGN; MULTI-UNIT AUCTION; OPTIMAL SOLUTIONS; POLYNOMIAL-TIME; POLYNOMIAL-TIME MECHANISM; RANDOMIZED MECHANISM; TRUTHFUL APPROXIMATION; TRUTHFUL MECHANISMS;

COMPUTER SCIENCE; FIBER OPTIC CHEMICAL SENSORS; MACHINE DESIGN; POLYNOMIAL APPROXIMATION;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77952327039     PISSN: 02725428     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1109/FOCS.2009.42     Document Type: Conference Paper

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