Computationally efficient approximation mechanisms

Algorithmic Game Theory

Volumn 9780521872829, Issue , 2007, Pages 301-330

  Lavi, Ron ^a  

^a TECHNION ISRAEL INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Israel)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ABSTRACTING; APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL EFFICIENCY; MACHINE DESIGN;

ALLOCATION PROBLEMS; ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISMS; MECHANISM DESIGN THEORIES; MONOTONICITY CONDITIONS; WORST-CASE ANALYSIS;

COMMERCE;

EID: 57949116749     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511800481.014     Document Type: Chapter

References (18)

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